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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between sports mega-events and the coronavirus disease-
2019 pandemic. Focusing primarily on the 2020 Summer Olympics and Union of European
Football Associations Euro 2020 in football – representing two mega-events that were postponed
due to the pandemic – this article explores the emerging discourses from sport governing bodies,
and how these organisations communicated their initial responses to the pandemic between
February and May 2020. The article takes a digital qualitative research approach and draws
upon frame analysed media sources and public communications. As it proceeds, this article first
illuminates how global sports entered a temporary standstill and, second, how sport governing
bodies positioned themselves with regard to responding to the global crisis from within the sport-
ing sphere. Subsequently, this article emphasises how the relevant responses, as communicated by
sport governing bodies, reflected the broader reactive and adaptive pandemic responses apparent
within socio-political fields.
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Introduction
This article examines the intersections between coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19)
and sports mega-events (SMEs). Sociologists are encouraged to analyse the global
health crisis caused by COVID-19 (Matthewman and Huppatz, 2020), and arguably
SMEs – like sports more widely (see Rowe, 2020) – serve as relevant sites for such
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sociological analysis. That is because SMEs have well-established capacities to reflect or
reveal broader social and cultural processes and changes (Boykoff, 2020; Millward,
2017; Roche, 2000). Defined here as ‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and
sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international
significance’ (Roche, 2000: 1), SMEs – even those that are postponed – present valuable
opportunities for understanding certain aspects of one of the largest global crises and tra-
gedies in recent times. More specifically, this article explores how the SME ‘franchise
owners’ (Graeff and Knijnik, 2021), the sport governing bodies, such as the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA), responded to the pandemic through their public communications and
discourses.
In doing so, the article first offers an understanding of how the SME universe entered a
standstill between February and March 2020 and this standstill’s surrounding discourses.
Then, it investigates exactly how sport governing bodies positioned themselves publicly
with regard to responding to COVID-19 from within sports. Crucially, these exemplars of
public communications remain particularly relevant since sporting bodies ‘must […]
communicate with the global public on an ongoing basis to promote the sport,
enhance its visibility and attest to its fairness and legitimacy’ (Murray and Pigman,
2014: 1111). Therefore, the communicated responses surrounding SME postponements
can assist our understanding of the processes surrounding the postponement decisions
and the roles of international sporting bodies in the global crisis.
From a reading of media sources and public communications, this article advances two
key arguments. First, that the sporting standstill in February and March 2020 involving,
inter alia, the postponement of the giants of the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo and the multi-
country 2020 European Football Championship (Euro 2020) reflected the wider transition
of COVID-19 from a ‘risk’ to an ‘immediate threat’ (see Domingues, 2020). Second, the
article demonstrates how sport governing bodies sought expertise from health fields,
including health experts and organisations. In a way, they adopted similar regulatory
mechanisms that could be witnessed in the wider political circles in the responses to a
pandemic, which did not distinguish between sport and the wider society. Collectively,
these arguments are sociologically telling: essentially the staging of an SME links
together sport governing bodies, corporations, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and other institutions (Giulianotti and Brownell, 2012), and these structures
were disrupted by the crisis. Further, critical analyses of sports can extend our under-
standing of wider global issues (such as a pandemic) (Giulianotti and Robertson,
2004) and governance (Włoch, 2012). The insights of this paper underscore these posi-
tions in a new context where international organisations were forced to act and respond.
Taken together, the article extends pre-existing literature in three separate ways. First,
it chronologically breaks down the dramatic sporting standstill between February and
May 2020; the period in which the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) declared
that COVID-19 was a pandemic. Second, the article contributes to the growing scholar-
ship on the powerful nexus between sport and COVID-19, and reflects calls for research
on the impacts of COVID-19 in the sports world (Parnell et al., 2020; Rowe, 2020).
Finally, this paper offers a sociological understanding of how sport governing bodies –
representing the SME ‘franchise owners’ (Graeff and Knijnik, 2021) – publicly
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communicated their SME-related responses to COVID-19 between February and May
2020. Focusing on the postponed 2020 Olympics and Euro 2020, this paper adds to
the pre-existing literature on these global media events. Yet, more distinctively and
uniquely, it also offers novel insights that can answer the emerging questions related
to the dramatic postponements of the two SMEs.
Literature review: between risk and threat
This article is concerned with how the ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ of COVID-19 was responded to
by sport governing bodies and key actors in the terrain of SMEs between February and
May 2020. This represented the period where the futures of several sporting events were
decided upon by their relevant administrators and organisers (Tovar, 2020; Weed, 2020).
Yet, first, it remains important to unpack COVID-19 as a ‘risk’ and ‘threat’, and the
broader state and governmental responses to the pandemic. The new coronavirus was
first detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 (WHO, 2020). Between December
2019 and February 2020, the infectious disease, COVID-19, caused by the
SARS-CoV-2 virus first extended to Asian regions and, eventually, worldwide.
Whereas COVID-19 was first characterised as an epidemic, it was confirmed on 11
March, by WHO (2020), that it constituted a pandemic. Ultimately, pandemics and
their associated responses warrant sociological analyses – and ‘[a]s a portal, the virus
demands that we all think sociologically’ (Matthewman and Huppatz, 2020: 6).
Although it remains important to acknowledge that the crisis is a ‘moving target’ that
is continuing (Domingues, 2020: 13) at the time of writing.
Infectious disease outbreaks require rapid responses. Indeed, the ‘case of COVID-19
has proved the importance of governments responding swiftly in face of a pandemic to
prevent viruses becoming a monstrous agent’ (Zinn, 2020: 1088). Swift responses, ultim-
ately, depend on states and supranational organisations, like WHO, that can influence the
political responses and disease governance (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).
However, responses do not automatically translate into disease elimination – and in
this highly unpredictable and uncertain climate, Beck’ s (1992) risk society theory can
assist an understanding of the global crisis (Domingues, 2020; Zinn, 2020).
Beck (1992) observed an increasingly globalised world where ‘risks’ became the key
drivers for social change. Accordingly, a ‘risk’ refers to ‘a systematic way of dealing
with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernity itself’ (Beck,
1992: 21). Beck drew attention to the shift away from an industrial society towards
the ‘risk society’. Some of the key pillars here include risks’ time-related and geograph-
ical mobilities and disastrous potential. In societies engrossed with risks and uncertain-
ties – and, indeed, mitigating them – and where risks exceed national borderlines and
temporal settings, there is also an increased dependence on science and experts.
Importantly, in the management of risk, politicians, governments and individuals
have come to depend substantially on expert guidance and scientific knowledge
(Nygren and Olofsson, 2020). Hence, Beck’s ideas may ‘help us make sense of the
present [COVID-19] crisis’ (Domingues, 2020: 3), and as Zinn (2020: 1083) submits
regarding global risks:
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From the early days of technological disasters, through to the financial crisis, international
terrorism and climate change, cosmopolitan spaces open up for international collaboration,
necessary to successfully manage such global challenges
COVID-19 represents another ‘global challenge’ – which is unselective, transnational
(Beck, 1992) and does not ‘respect national boundaries’ (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen,
2014: 335–336). Globally, various public health measures have been implemented by
governments, NGOs and individuals (Mann et al., 2020; Mutz and Gerke, 2021).
Some of the pandemic responses have included quarantines, social distancing, lockdowns
and restrictions on people’s movements, including travelling bans and suspensions of
public gatherings and social life. Still, despite international collaborative efforts, states
have responded differently to the pandemic. For instance, the responses to the first out-
break of COVID-19 were marked by the ‘extreme uncertainty of the measures taken
by the governments of the various countries to stem the pandemic spread’ (Corsini
et al., 2020: 1186). Crucially, however, such measures are not solely implemented to
manage the pandemic risk. Indeed, Domingues (2020) points to the pandemic’s transition
from a ‘risk’ to a ‘threat’:
Now we no longer face risk, we are confronted with a concrete, immediate threat: the spread of
the new coronavirus and Covid-19 disease, costing lives and disrupting collective existence.
If risk refers to something possible or likely to happen, a threat is already a moving entity, in
this case a specific one: the coronavirus […] A threat hence appears as an immediate danger,
a concrete possibility of harm, not a sort of virtual, abstract risk. Threat instantiates risk,
we may say (Domingues, 2020: 3, original emphasis)
This transition remains central, and notwithstanding, the need to respond to the risk
and concretised threat of COVID-19 has not been confined to political, scientific,
health or educational circles. Fundamentally, sports represent a key domain where
COVID-19 has had enormous impacts (Parnell et al., 2020) and has required responses
from sports’ governors.
Pandemic responses and SMEs
In the sports world, as central here, it is detectable that numerous SMEs have been post-
poned or cancelled (Weed, 2020). Postponed SMEs include the 2020 Tokyo Olympics,
Euro 2020 (originally to be staged across 12 host countries) and the 2020 Copa América
(to be hosted by Argentina and Columbia). Here, it remains imperative to underline that
SME postponements or cancellations do represent key responses to COVID-19 made by
the distinctive sport governing bodies such as UEFA, IOC or Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA). Still, the discourses surrounding the decisions to post-
pone the mega-events require further investigation in the pandemic’s context.
Critically engaging with the SME-related discourses and dynamics can facilitate a dis-
aggregation of sport governing bodies’ responses to the pandemic. This remains relevant
because studies establish that sport governing bodies are powerful and emerging global
actors that govern sport (Boykoff, 2020; Millward, 2017; Włoch, 2012) and ‘set the rules
4 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 0(0)
of the game’ (Włoch, 2012: 307) before every SME. For example, according to Boykoff
(2011: 42), the IOC may be positioned ‘[s]omewhere between multinational corporation
and global institution’, whereas SMEs reveal networked relationships between nation-
states, corporations (i.e. mega-event sponsors) and sport governing bodies (Millward,
2017). Ultimately, SMEs are organised by global sport organisations, but hosted by
nation-states (Włoch, 2020). Besides, the flurry of public/private interests and supra-
national authority has, of course, become apparent in the responses to the health crisis.
Engagement with sport governing bodies’ responses to COVID-19 remains compat-
ible with the suggestion by Rowe (2020) holding that pandemic sports should be
subject to sociological procedures. Since the sports world has not been isolated from
COVID-19, it is possible to transplant the discussed ideas of ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ in relation
to COVID-19 (Domingues, 2020; Zinn, 2020) into sports’ terrain. Ultimately, there is a
gap in the literature with regard to how the global ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ of COVID-19 was
initially responded to by sport governing bodies and other key actors in the dramatic
period where numerous SME’s futures were decided upon and discussed. One exception
here is the study by Hindman et al. (2021) on the National Basketball League’s (NBA)
organisational responses to COVID-19. Here, it is demonstrated how the NBA’s response
was characterised by an acknowledgement of the uncertainty, the desire to operate cau-
tiously whilst also taking risks in the attempt to resume the competition following its sus-
pension in March 2020. Yet, overall, little is known about SME ‘franchise owners’’
responses to COVID-19. Here, it is also possible to apply some key premises from
Beck’s theory to sports and to present-day SMEs. Nonetheless, despite important excep-
tions (i.e. Cleland, 2019), it argued that: ‘In sport, Beck’s analysis has had surprisingly
little impact, possibly because of the limited risk reflexivity within sporting cultures’
(Giulianotti, 2009: 551).
Therefore, this article seeks to examine how some sports governing bodies responded
to the pandemic beyond merely announcing SME postponements/cancellations, and how
these decisions were publicly communicated. This may offer insight into the governance
and politics of SMEs and the pandemic. Further, in themselves, postponed mega-events
remain interesting to explore since they are extremely rare (Tovar, 2020), generate enor-
mous media interest (Giulianotti and Collison, 2020) and come at huge financial costs
(AP News, 2020a). In order to examine sport governing bodies’ responses to
COVID-19, this article will first explore how the SME world – much like the rest of
the world – entered a mode of ‘standstill’ between February and March 2020. Then, it
sets out to examine how sport governing bodies, subsequently, publicly responded to –
and positioned themselves – with regard to resolving the emerging threat.
Method and theoretical position
The article focuses on the postponements of the 2020 Summer Olympics (owned by IOC)
and Euro 2020 (owned by European football’s governing body, UEFA). The selection of
these specific SMEs is justified by the fact that, first, these are among the most popular
SMEs globally and traditionally have attracted large numbers of visitors, whilst corre-
sponding with Roche’s (2000) aforementioned mega-event definition. Second, and cru-
cially, both these SMEs were originally scheduled between June and August 2020,
Lee Ludvigsen 5
whereas these mega-events’ futures received broad media coverage – demonstrating the
widespread interest in these events, and the general sports-COVID nexus (Giulianotti and
Collison, 2020).
The article adapts a digital qualitative research approach and draws its data from media
quotes and interview material withinmedia sources (collected through Google News) and
official statements/communications from sport governing bodies’ official websites. The
selection of this type of data source is explained by three key reasons. First, the media
was among the key sites where the SME’s doubtful futures and postponements were
commented-upon or discussed – even in a global crisis with limited live sports
(Giulianotti and Collison, 2020). Furthermore, ‘[w]ebsites have become major portals
for international sporting bodies to communicate about their aims and the aims of the
sport’ (Murray and Pigman, 2014: 1111). Second, the turn towards secondary sources
was made in the context of the unobtrusiveness of this approach during a time where
social distancing measures, understandably, impacted methodological alternatives.
Third, the strengths of electronic media sources are confirmed in similar studies investi-
gating the discursive framing of various socio-political issues around SMEs (Atkinson
and Young, 2012).
Upon data collection, targeted searches were performed for media articles that consid-
ered or mentioned the relevant events, which contained interview materials from key
actors/organisations around the mentioned SMEs. Following Atkinson and Young
(2012: 290), there was no rigid selection criteria that guided the sampling strategy,
which may be best described as a ‘blend of purposive and convenience sampling’.
This was then operationalised by using the following terms to inform the targeted
searches: COVID-19, coronavirus, Euro 2020, Olympics, IOC and UEFA. Upon sam-
pling, however, the inclusion criteria were that the media sources were written in
English language, published between 1 February and 31 May 2020, addressed or consid-
ered the relevant SME’s futures (in COVID-19’s context), and/or included quotes/state-
ments by key actors/organisations of the two SMEs. Consequently, media sources solely
mentioning the 2020 Olympics or Euro 2020 in passing, or published before/after the
timeframe, were excluded from the final sample, which meant that, overall, 82 electronic
media sources were sampled together with 26 official communications/announcements
released by UEFA, IOC, or relevant sporting bodies. The specific timeframe of these
sources (1 February–31 May 2020) was selected because this represented the period in
which the relevant events’ futures were discussed, acted upon, and where the immediate
postponement-related aftermath occurred. In the beginning of March 2020, the number of
global COVID-19 cases surpassed 100,000 (WHO, 2020) and it was when COVID-19’s
impact ‘became clearer during February and March 2020, sports event hosts and admin-
istrators began to consider whether their events should be postponed or cancelled’ (Weed,
2020: 82). Then, as Bandyopadhyay (2021: 1) notes, ‘the gradual resumption of games
and tournaments from May 2020 onwards began to represent the early impressions
and initial responses to the pandemic’. In this period, a vaccine was not yet developed.
Therefore, although this study’s 4-month timeframe appears limited, this period proved
extremely dramatic in the sports world.
Importantly, newspaper articles should be approached with some caution given the
possible journalistic bias, newspapers’ profitable aims or the potential lack of context.
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Notwithstanding, following Millward (2017), the study is concerned with the quotes/
statements from key individuals/organisations available within the media sources.
Therefore, the unit of analysis is not the journalistic accounts of the postponed SMEs.
Similar to Millward’s study of the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup build-up, the units of
analysis are the public statements and quotes within the media sources. Still, the idea
of ‘fantasy documents’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012) may be useful in this context.
Published as reports, statements or policy documents, these articulations may be issued
by sport governing bodies in times of uncertainty. They are ‘formulated specifically to
address public anxieties’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 253) and to generate reassurances.
Whilst this implies that caution must be exercised concerning a possible non-
correspondence between public rhetoric and the actual realities, it would concurrently
‘be too cynical to regard such documents as outright fabrications’ (Boyle and
Haggerty, 2012: 252). And principally, this article remains concerned with how pan-
demic responses were publicly communicated.
Frame analysis
The collected statements/quotes were manually analysed with a frame analysis technique
developed by theorist Goffman (1974). Essentially, Goffman’s influential work was prin-
cipally concerned with social interaction contexts, and in Frame Analysis, Goffman
underlined the importance of the organisation of experience; especially how ‘individuals
organize their experiences into meaningful activities and settle on a clear definition of
their reality’ (Millward, 2017: 762). The relevant social actors’ definitions of specific
situations remain central here; and in this regard, Goffman (1974) observed how specific
segments of discourses were more heavily weighted than others, and how discourses
proceed to impact how specific situations are described.
Frames are accordingly defined as the ‘principles of organization which govern events –
at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them’ (Goffman, 1974: 10–11).
Therefore, frames can serve to organise and interpret experiences of the social world and
its realities. However, importantly, frame analysis techniques can also be applied to
the discourses of sport governing bodies. Here, such approaches aid understandings of
how sporting bodies – representing social actors – frame specific situations or develop-
ments (see Millward, 2017).
Hence, the collected statements and media sources were frame analysed according to
two keyframes corresponding with my research aims. First, how COVID-19 was dis-
cussed and described by sport governing bodies as the future of the 2020 Olympics
and Euro 2020 became increasingly doubtful. This would then allow for an understanding
of how the unfolding realities of the pandemic were experienced and defined by the sport
governing bodies. Second, how the issue of resolving the global crisis was framed by the
sport governing bodies in relation to the relevant SMEs.
Tracing the sporting standstill
The cancelled or postponed SMEs, of course, represented crucial and highly visible
responses to the pandemic from the sports world. This section breaks down and provides
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a narrative of the period in which sports gradually entered a standstill (primarily between
February and March 2020). This is complemented and contextualised by the framed dis-
courses from sport governing bodies in this period. As argued, the initial responses and
emerging discourses occurred alongside the wider (see Domingues, 2020) and indeed
sporting-specific concretisation of COVID-19 as a threat.
For context, throughout January and February 2020, COVID-19 was still considered
an epidemic and it remained unclear exactly what impact the crisis would have on
SMEs and the rest of the world, although early reports suggested that the infectious
disease could impact the 2020 Olympics (Reuters, 2020). In China – where the virus
was first detected – the Chinese Super League was suspended on 30 January 2020
(Tovar, 2020). In Europe, however, sporting events were not suspended at first (Corsini
et al., 2020). Until late February 2020, Euro 2020 seemed to be staged as planned, until
indications of what was unfolding emerged from Italy, as Serie A games began to take
place behind ‘closed doors’, since Italy (one of Euro 2020’s hosts), was affected earlier
than other countries by the virus (Corsini et al., 2020). A Rugby Six Nations match, to
be staged in Dublin on 7th March, between Ireland and Italy, was also postponed over
‘health concerns’ on 26 February (BBC, 2020a). Not long after, The Independent (2020)
reported that the virus had forced UEFA into ‘crisis talks’ concerning Euro 2020. As
UEFA Vice President, Michele Uva, commented: ‘We are monitoring country by
country, and football must follow the orders of the individual countries. The sporting
path will only be closed if the situation gets worse’ (quoted in The Independent, 2020).
Interestingly, here one may see how Euro 2020’s hosting style, involving 12 different
European countries, was framed as a particular issue (‘monitoring country by country’).
On 3 March, reports again emerged over Euro 2020’s future (The Guardian, 2020a)
and UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin acknowledged that the coronavirus added to
the security-related concerns and political obstacles that usually surround contemporary
SMEs such as ‘terrorism’ (Cleland, 2019), crime or ‘hooliganism’:
We are dealing with it and we are confident we can deal with it […] You don’t know how many
big concerns we have: we have security concerns, political instability and one is also the virus.
Let’s try to be optimistic, not think about dark scenarios – there’s time for that later (quoted in
The Guardian, 2020a)
Meanwhile, in a different UEFA tournament – the Champions League – the fixtures on
10 March were characterised by inconsistency, with the situation and responses differing
between European countries. In Spain, Valencia–Atalanta took place behind closed
doors, whereas RB Leipzig–Tottenham was staged in front of a full crowd in
Germany. The next day, when WHO confirmed that COVID-19 was a pandemic
(Corsini et al., 2020), Paris Saint German-Borussia Dortmund took place behind
closed doors, whereas Liverpool–Atletico Madrid was staged with 52,000 fans inside
the stadium (Bandyopadhyay, 2021) – demonstrating the country-specific measures
apparent vis-à-vis sporting events. In a way, key turning points were the WHO’s assess-
ments, COVID-19 becoming a pandemic, and reports of infected athletes and managers
(BBC, 2020b), as several domestic leagues were suspended between 12 and 13 March
(see Tovar, 2020).
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The unfolding situation and the suspension of domestic leagues called for action in
relation to the 2020 Olympics and Euro 2020. For example, UEFA announced on 12
March that they invited to a stakeholder meeting, following the ‘ongoing developments
in the spread of COVID-19 across Europe and the changing analysis of the World Health
Organization,’ which would also involve discussions about Euro 2020 (UEFA, 2020a).
On 13 March, football’s international governing body, FIFA, issued a statement that
set the tone for the forthcoming week. FIFA (2020) recommended that all international
games scheduled for March and April should be postponed until they could be staged
in a ‘safe and secure environment.’
Then, on 17 March 2020, UEFA confirmed that, following a decision by UEFA’s
Executive Committee, Euro 2020 had been postponed to 11 June–11 July 2021. The
announcement stated that: ‘The health of all those involved in the game is the priority,
as well as to avoid placing any unnecessary pressure on national public services involved
in staging matches’ (UEFA, 2020b). With the planned staging of Euro 2020 becoming
incompatible with health and safety, Čeferin also commented that:
We are at the helm of a sport that vast numbers of people live and breathe that has been laid low
by this invisible and fast-moving opponent. It is at times like these that the football community
needs to show responsibility, unity, solidarity and altruism (quoted in UEFA, 2020b, emphasis
added)
Ultimately, this quote reveals the virus’s acceleration-based characteristic as a
‘fast-moving opponent’. However, as Weed (2020: 82) writes, there was still – as late
as 19 March 2020 – an insistence around the Olympics that ‘it was too early to decide
whether to cancel the Games’. As an IOC (2020a) communique released on 18 March
stated: ‘there is no need for any drastic decisions at this stage’. Such a stance was criti-
cised and, as Giulianotti and Collison (2020: 6) highlight, the ‘IOC leadership attracted
further protests from many athletes and some sport federations for delaying the seemingly
unavoidable decision, to postpone the Tokyo 2020 Olympics’. With the rapidly changing
circumstances and some nations declaring their intention not to participate – should the
Olympics proceed as planned – the 2020 Olympics were eventually postponed on 24
March. As the Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
(Tokyo 2020) announced:
In the present circumstances and based on the information provided by the WHO today, the IOC
President and the Prime Minister of Japan have concluded that the Games of the XXXII
Olympiad in Tokyo must be rescheduled to a date beyond 2020 but not later than summer
2021, to safeguard the health of the athletes, everybody involved in the Olympic Games and
the international community (Tokyo 2020, 2020)
Similar to UEFA’s statement, one can observe that a situation is framed where the
health and safety of individuals (the ‘athletes’ and ‘everybody involved’) had to be pro-
vided protection. This connects with Mann et al. (2020: 1071), who note that ‘the rhetoric
emerging from international sporting organisations, such as the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), has emphasised the importance of protecting athlete health’.
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On 25 March, when commenting on the factors contributing to IOC’s altered stance, IOC
President Thomas Bach commented that this was because of ‘developments with the
dynamic spreading of the coronavirus’ and the alarming information on the accelerated
virus spread (quoted in IOC, 2020b). With the Olympics rescheduled to between 23
July and 8 August 2021 (Constandt and Willem, 2020), the then-head of Japan’s
Olympic organising committee, Yoshiro Mori, also spoke of an unprecedented situation:
‘In the past, when there were such problems, like wartime, it has been cancelled. This
time, we are fighting an invisible enemy’ (quoted in Sky News, 2020).
The above breakdown of events and the discourses surrounding the eventual postpone-
ments reveal several important processes. First, these SME postponements must be consid-
ered historical moments within sports’ social history, where postponements are rare (Tovar,
2020) and testing for stakeholders. As Constandt andWillem (2020: 53) put it, ‘a postpone-
ment of such size is unseen in the history of the modern Olympic Games’. Moreover, the
gradual change of stance is remarkable and illustrates a shift from a publicly articulated
view maintaining that the SMEs, possibly, could proceed – to the postponement decisions,
in order to prioritise and safeguard health and safety.
In a way, the above discourses can demonstrate the aforementioned transition of
COVID-19 from a ‘risk’ towards an ‘immediate threat’, whereby a threat is characterised
by its immediacy and concrete realities (Domingues, 2020). Whereas this does not mean
the pandemic was not causing harm and deaths before this concretisation, one may see
that the pandemic transitions from being one of the several risks that mega-events are
exposed to, and must contemplate, towards becoming the main threat. As Domingues
writes, this shift was ‘necessitating changes in how the nation-state intervenes and
how global health administration – particularly at a political level – will possibly
change’ (Domingues, 2020: 13). This happens in parallel with a situation where the
crisis unfolds rapidly and where uncertainty and harm are defining and present features.
Arguably, this important shift, when it occurs in the wider society, has reflexive conse-
quences in the terrain of sport, which is neither isolated nor exempt.
This meant that SME hosts and key actors, as shown, had to intervene and respond by
deciding to postpone their SMEs, as the cases of Euro 2020 and the 2020 Olympics col-
lectively exemplify. It is also worth noticing what the next section explains in detail.
Namely, the framed turn towards health experts beyond sports’ realm. This is, for
example, demonstrated by the changing assessments of WHO which, as framed by
UEFA and IOC above, would partly inform the eventual decisions to postpone the rele-
vant mega-events originally scheduled between June and August 2020. Hence, although
SME postponements or cancellations represented the most obvious and visible initial
responses to COVID-19 vis-à-vis SMEs, this section disassembles – in a chronological
manner – the framed discourses from these events’ key actors. Unpacking these dis-
courses simultaneously gives a glimpse of what seemingly informed the
postponement-related responses throughout late-February and March 2020.
Finding expertise beyond sports
Pandemics require immediate responses. Indeed, Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014: 336)
note that pandemics are among the ‘prototypical crisis scenarios in which high-speed
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decisionmaking and rapid political interventions are seen to be needed’. This need, to
urgently respond, and eventually overcome the health crisis, can also be situated in sports.
Therefore, this section maps out the prognostically framed outcomes of COVID-19. It
explores how sport governing bodies framed the issues of resolving the global crisis and
how they publicly communicated their own position vis-à-vis responding to COVID-19
beyond SME postponements and in relation to safely staging the rescheduled events.
Although the discussed postponements, in themselves, represented key responses made
by sport governing bodies, these did not serve to resolve the pandemic more broadly.
Instead, the rescheduling of SMEs could help containi the outbreaks in the overarching cli-
mates of uncertainty. In the face of a threat that, essentially, did not distinguish between
SMEs and the rest of the society, it is argued that the below examples demonstrate how
sport governing bodies looked towards knowledge and guidance from health experts and
international health organisations. Consequently, scientific progress and health expertise
became firmly embedded into the discourses of how SMEs could safely return.
This could, however, be observed even before the SMEs were postponed. On 3 March
2020, IOC (2020c) could report that they would ‘continue to follow the advice of WHO’,
and that: ‘A joint task force had already been created in mid-February, involving the IOC,
Tokyo 2020, the host city of Tokyo, the government of Japan and the World Health
Organization (WHO)’. One could also see how the ‘changing analysis of the World
Health Organization’ (UEFA, 2020a) and ‘information provided by the WHO’ (Tokyo,
2020) were framed earlier in the context of the decisions to postpone the respective
SMEs. Further, in light of Euro 2020’s postponement (17 March 2020), UEFA together
with the European Club Association, European Leagues and FIFPROEurope signed a reso-
lution on ‘how European football should react to the challenges created by the COVID-19
pandemic’ (UEFA, 2020c). This coordinated response involved a contingency plan which
‘[took] into consideration the advice of international health experts as well as the restrictive
orders issued by national governments and local authorities (UEFA, 2020c)’. Already here,
the distinctive turn towards health expertise becomes apparent.
A similar framing was also evident in the communication of IOC (2020d) on 6 May
2020, where WHOwas described as ‘instrumental’ by giving IOC ‘real-time information’
prior to the Olympic postponement. Further, it confirmed that: ‘WHO continues to advise
the IOC and the Tokyo 2020 Organising Committee on how to ensure that the Olympic
Games will take place in a safe environment for all those involved’ (IOC, 2020d). WHO
is framed by IOC as the ‘instrumental’ actor from which the necessary expert advice
could be obtained in the build-up for a safe staging of the rescheduled Olympics. In
the context of disease governance, WHO can be considered a global emergency governor
that can define crises and emergencies, provide or formulate policy guidelines, and guide
political responses (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). As this evidence suggests,
this extended into the terrain of sport, and a similar framing becomes apparent in
another statement issued two days later:
We will follow the risk management and mitigation measures set out by the World Health
Organization (WHO) for mass gatherings […] We will continue to follow the principle that
has driven all our decisions so far, which is to organise Olympic Games only in a safe environ-
ment for all people involved (IOC, 2020e).
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In a way, the framed efforts to provide a ‘safe environment’ reflect the broader public
reliance in and dependence on expert systems (Nygren and Olofsson, 2020) and
can illuminate the politics of knowledge and hierarchies of relevant expertise that
emerged throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Since overcoming COVID-19 largely
remains a scientific question, sport governing bodies seemingly adopted a position
where they adapted to the guidelines from the discursively framed health experts, as
central to the wider pandemic responses. However, in a way, those framed health
experts still depended on sport governing bodies to act. On 18 March, when the 2020
Olympics’ future was still not decided upon, WHO spokesperson, Tarik Jasarevic,
stated that:
It is not the role of WHO to call off or not call off any type of events […] As each international
mass gathering is different, the factors to consider when determining if the event should be can-
celled may also differ. Any decision to change a planned international gathering should be based
on a careful assessment of the risks and how they can be managed, and the level of event plan-
ning (quoted in The Guardian, 2020b).
The above statements not only demonstrate the increased centrality of international
health experts – who remain externally placed in relation to sports – to sport governing
bodies’ decision-making and attempts to ensure the safe rescheduling of SMEs. They also
illustrate how health organisations like WHO still depended on sporting bodies to take
action (’call off or not call off any type of events’). Although, the main point here is
that sport governing bodies seemingly were influenced by the analysis, directives and
assessments produced by actors on the outside of sports.
This, in itself, remains unsurprising. Yet, this is a broader trend that can be identified at
the state, governmental and institutional levels. When global crises occur, uncertainty
looms large and urgent decision-making is necessary, ‘turning to IOs [international orga-
nisations] is a natural choice because of both their centralisation and their expertise’
(Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 336). Notwithstanding, the point made here is
that it was not merely governments nor authorities that looked towards health experts
in the state of crisis. Seemingly, such a stance was consciously replicated by sport gov-
erning bodies too. Thus, as sport governing bodies arrived at their decisions to postpone
SMEs – and eventually began planning for the rescheduled mega-events, the decision-
making and planning were seemingly informed by the guidelines emanating from
health experts that were externally found: outside the sphere of sports. In part, this can
help us understand the SME ‘franchise owners’ communicated responses to COVID-19.
The public communications above remain telling since they suggest a turn towards
expert voices and scientific knowledge in the period of global crisis. Despite this,
however, it is clear that uncertainty levels still existed and that there were no guarantees
that the pandemic would be ‘under control’ by the Olympics’ new dates (Constandt and
Willem, 2020: 54). Indeed, even at the time of writing, less than three months before the
2020 Olympics are due to commence, extreme uncertainty still surrounds this Olympic
edition (The Independent, 2021; Shimizu et al., 2021). Meanwhile, in March 2021, inter-
national spectators were banned from travelling to attend the Games over COVID-19
concerns (CNN, 2021). Furthermore, the scientific debate consists of a ‘heterogeneous
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supply of scientific interpretations’ (Beck, 1992: 157) and COVID-19 is surrounded by
‘contested knowledge claims’ (Wardman and Lofstedt, 2020: 834). One can see hints
towards this reality, as the UEFA President Čeferin, when commenting on the return
of ‘normality’ and European football, acknowledged that: ‘Even the expert doctors
don’t know when this [COVID-19] will finish […] The more we will respect that
[COVID restrictions], the faster the crisis will finish’ (quoted in AP News, 2020b).
In the risk society context, such acknowledgement illustrates the unpredictability and
uncertainty that endured despite following the paths of health experts. Overall, this feeds
into this section, which demonstrates sports bodies’ conscious turn towards guidelines
and recommendations from health experts and international organisations. Whilst such
a move, in isolation, may seem unsurprising, these exemplars display, within the specific
timeframe, how sport governing bodies’ responses to the unfolding crisis, in distinctive
ways, reflected the broader political and governmental responses to the pandemic. This
saw scientific knowledge and health specialists becoming embedded into the planning
and safe delivery of the rescheduled SMEs.
Conclusion
For Roche (2000: 235), mega-events occupy sociologically important positions as
‘intergenerational cultural reference points’ that leave memorable and enduring marks
on the social calendars of modern societies. Mega-events, Roche argues, are some of
modern society’s great ‘parades’ and ‘shows’ (Roche, 2000: 1). Against this background,
it represented defining turning points when ‘the show’ could not go on, and numerous
mega-events originally due to be staged in 2020 were postponed because of the
COVID-19 pandemic. This included two SMEs with global profiles, media reach, and
popularity: the 2020 Olympics and Euro 2020.
In the case of these SMEs, this article has explored how the sport governing bodies –
who organise and administrate the mentioned SMEs – responded to the pandemic
through their public communications. This remains of particular relevance since sport
governing bodies are powerful, influential and truly global actors (Graeff and Knijnik,
2021; Millward, 2017; Włoch, 2012). In global societies, SMEs form time-specific and
networked spaces wherein states (for example, host countries) and non-state actors,
like UEFA, FIFA or IOC, enter what Włoch (2020: 46) call ‘intensive interest-driven
interactions’. Essentially, these networked structures were impacted by the global
crisis. Therefore, this article offers an understanding of supranational organisations’
roles, discourses and responses in a global crisis, drawing from a corpus of media
sources and sporting organisations’ public communications.
This article argues that the sporting ‘standstill’ (the period wherein Euro 2020 and
the Olympics were postponed for a year), occurring primarily between late February
and March 2020, illustrated how the ‘risk’ of COVID-19 became concretised as an
‘immediate threat’ (Domingues, 2020) requiring intervention in world sport. Further,
the article argues that sport governing bodies, through their discourses, emphasised
their turn towards externalised expertise in the form of health experts and international
organisations, which could provide guidance in the endeavour of responding to and,
eventually, trying to resolve the global crisis. Looking to existing literature, such a
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manoeuvres can be contextualised by the expert dependence and trust which influence
risk management and mitigation in uncertainty-loaded risk societies (Beck, 1992).
By synthesising the above arguments, it can be argued that the apparatuses of govern-
ance surrounding SMEs resembled the broader regulatory mechanisms of how the pan-
demic crisis was responded to on a political level. This included decision-making
based upon ‘expert authorities’ assessments’ (Nygren and Olofsson, 2020: 1032), as
with COVID-19, ‘we face an ambivalent situation when the constant presence of risk
and uncertainty increases our daily dependence on expertise’ (Nygren and Olofsson,
2020: 1035). Given the pandemic’s global scope – both as a risk and threat – this
study’s arguments can thus support the overarching suggestions that analyses of global
issues in sport can assist a more mainstream understanding of those same global issues
(Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004), though such a position acquires a set of new meanings
in the pandemic sport context.
Taken together, this article makes a threefold academic contribution to the sociology
of sport and SME studies. First, it disaggregates the discourses, processes and communi-
cations related to the sporting standstill between February andMay 2020. This was a truly
exceptional period where the futures of several SMEs were acted upon by their owners
and organisers. This period could be approached as a particularly critical time in
sports’ social history. Second, as called for (Parnell et al., 2020; Rowe, 2020), the
article makes important advances towards a sociological understanding of one aspect
of the relationship between sports and COVID-19. Essentially, the ‘pandemic had an
extraordinary impact on world sport’ (Giulianotti and Collison, 2020: 1) – and this under-
scores the importance of critically exploring the sport/pandemic intersection. Third, this
article extends our knowledge of two important SMEs with prolonged timelines: the 2020
Olympics and Euro 2020 (Boykoff, 2020; Constandt and Willem, 2020; Hutchins and
Andrejevcic, 2021; Lee Ludvigsen, 2021). In themselves, these postponed mega-events
are likely to attract more academic attention as their new dates approach in time.
Notwithstanding, some limitations of this article should be highlighted. The exploratory
study has examined the relationship between SMEs and COVID-19 – and maybe is it too
early to reach firm conclusions about ‘something which is still underway’ (Matthewman
and Huppatz, 2020: 680). The article also focuses specifically on the unfolding period
between February and May 2020. Another caveat is that the paper predominantly
focuses on merely two postponed SMEs and the emerging discourses from these respect-
ive SMEs’ franchise owners. This limits the possibility for making any generalisable
claims, yet underlines the need for research on other SMEs postponed/cancelled through-
out 2020 and 2021.
COVID-19 has added new elements to the securitised consumption surrounding every
SME, namely public health and hygiene (Hutchins and Andrejevcic, 2021). Future
research should hence consider the emerging discourses surrounding ‘health’ and ‘safe-
guarding’ – and their meanings – as the rescheduled events approach and/or are staged.
This should be done in relation to attendees, local residents and athletes (see Mann et al.,
2020), especially so, should there be an outbreak of the virus before/during upcoming
mega-events. As Shimizu et al. (2021) remind us, serious safety-related concerns still
exist ahead of the upcoming 2020 Olympics despite the aforementioned exclusion of
international spectators in Tokyo. Then, it also remains to be seen how the pandemic
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and sport governing bodies’ management of the crisis have impacted the public opinion
on SMEs. For example, at the time of writing, there is widespread public opposition in
Japan to the staging of the 2020 Olympics in the summer of 2021 (The Independent,
2021). Sport governing bodies’ positions and responses may also have impacted
anti-Olympic activism (see Boykoff, 2020) or how spectators consider their personal
safety when visiting sports venues (Cleland, 2019). Moving forward, exploring such
broad questions can advance our understandings of how COVID-19 has impacted and
reshaped global sports’ or SME’s positions in modern society.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr. Daniel Feather (Liverpool John Moores University) for helpful
feedback on an early draft of this article. Thanks also to the anonymous peer-reviewers and the
Editor for their very constructive comments.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this
article.
ORCID iD
Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0085-2321
References
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